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NOTES
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: HIGHER STATE
STANDARDS AND THE QUESTION
OF PREEMPTION
The threat posed by alterations of the human environment is
rapidly expanding as a public issue. The potential severity of the consequences of fouling the environment has led all levels of government'
to action imposing controls on pollution of air and water.2 With the
development of nuclear power plants, local interest is also increasing
in the matter of radiations from atomic energy sources. 3 Recently, Minnesota imposed radiation emission standards on a nuclear power plant
which would permit slightly over one-fiftieth the amount of escaping
radiation that is currently allowed under Atomic Energy Commission
regulations.4
1 In addition to the federal, state, and municipal governments, new hybrid levels
of government have emerged in response to the problem. This has been praised as "creative
federalism" constituting "the first stages in the evolution of limited regional governments"
with reference to regional river basin commissions created to plan the development of
water resources. Hart, Creative Federalism: Recent Trends in Regional Water Resources
Planning and Development, 89 U. COLO. L. REv. 29 (1966). These bodies derive powers
from both the federal and state governments. Id. at 46. The air pollution control regions,
created by Air Quality Act of 1967, § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2 (Supp. IV, 1969), have
been criticized because of internal limitations which leave little more than a "grotesque
administrative unit." Reitze, The Role of the "Region" in Air Pollution Control, 20
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 809 (1969). Regional entities created through interstate compacts
have been criticized as permitting lax control in a serious problem area. Note, Interstate
Agreements for Air Pollution Control, 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 260, 282.
2 Responding to pressure from numerous citizens groups, local officials, state legislators, and governors are sponsoring legislation running the gamut from the creation of
state agencies, councils, and commissions to imposing stiff fines on polluting sources. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1970, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.). For examples of existing local, state, and
federal legislation, see Symposium-Air Pollution, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 205, 232-324.
A comprehensive environmental control bill was recently introduced in the New York
Legislature, sponsored by 41 legislators with bipartisan backing in both houses, and
supported by 300 nature and conservation organizations. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970,
at I, col. 4. President Nixon recently set up an executive Council on Environmental
Quality (Exec. Order No. 11,472, 34 Fed. Reg. 8693 (1969)), and his administration has
proposed broad legislation on pollution control. PP.SmEr'IL,% MESSAGE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuArry, H.R. Doc. No. 225, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., in 116 CONG. REc. S 1604 (daily ed.
Feb. 10, 1970).
3 See Helman, Pre-emption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict over Licensing
Nutclear Power Plants,51 M~AQ. L. REv. 43, 43-47 (1967); Lemov, State and Local Control
over the Location of Nuclear Reactors under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 39 N.Y.U.L.
R . 1008, 1008-09 (1964).
4 N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1970, at 17, col. 3. State attempts to impose independent
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The AEG has jurisdiction over nuclear power facilities, and the
Minnesota attempt to regulate is being challenged in court by a power
company on the basis of preemption by AEC standards.5 Viewing the
extremely broad and comprehensive federal program of regulation in
the field of peaceful uses of the atom and considering that the complex
technology of nuclear energy was federally developed, this challenge
seems tenable.0 But viewed from the standpoint of the state, whose
paramount interest lies in the protection of its populace, the immediate
threat of harm from radiation may appear as serious as that of air pollution, notwithstanding the current federal regulatory scheme. 7 State
radiation controls are not new. See Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards:
An IntergovernmentalRelations Problem, 60 MxcH. L. Rav. 41, 42-43 (1961).
Minnesota has been outspoken in the past in its opposition to federal preemption
of the control of peaceful atomic energy. See Cavers, State Responsibility in the Regulation
of Atomic Reactors, 50 Ky. L.J. 29, 31-32 (1961); Esgain, State Authority and Responsibility in the Atomic Energy Field, 1962 DuKE L.J. 163, 188.
5 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1970, at 17, col. 3. Four states have petitioned in federal
court for permission to file amicus curiae briefs supporting Minnesota's position, and seven
states have told Minnesota's Attorney General that they want their names attached to
his brief. Id. at 17, col. 7.
Congress has authorized the AEC to establish health and safety standards governing
possession and use of nuclear materials. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2201(b) (1964).
A detailed analysis of the question of federal preemption as applied to atomic energy
matters concluded that, with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress intended generally
to preempt the field. E. STAsoN, S. Es'
& W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 1002-74 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as AToMs AND THE LAW]. A later comment determined that "the generally
pre-emptive effect of the [amended Act] leads to only one conclusion: unless a state
executes an agreement with the AEC, the state is constitutionally precluded from imposing
general health and safety regulations upon users of [certain radioactive] materials." Estep
8&Adelman, supra note 4, at 63. See Cavers, supra note 4. A more recent effort found that
"the scheme of federal licensing established by the 1954 Act necessitates preclusion of
state regulation of radiation hazards associated with nuclear power plants, if the
objectives of the Act are to be realized .... " Helman, supra note 3, at 67.
In contrast to these analyses, one study of the 1954 Act, as amended in 1959, along
with its legislative history, concluded that the Act "should be construed to establish
minimum federal safety standards and to give state and local authorities concurrent
authority over the location of commercial reactors." Lemov, supra note 3, at 1026
(emphasis added). It is thus apparent that the Minnesota action raises a difficult issue
of federal preemption in a field of pervasive federal regulation, but less than clear
congressional intent. See generally JOINT COtMA.

ON

ATomic ENERGY,

86th CONG.,

IST SEss., SELECTED MATERIALS ON FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE AToMIc ENERGY FIELD

283453 (Comm. Print 1959).
0 A comprehensive federal program is an indication of preemptive intent. Since use
of atomic energy was developed under federal auspices and control, this area of conflict
stands apart from situations where state action has been tolerated. See ATOMs AND THE LAw
1023; Helman, supra note 3, at 59.
7 In the area of air pollution the current federal program expressly provides for
substantial state regulatory action. Note 14 infra.
It is not suggested that the control of radiation hazards is ultimately best suited to
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fears of the hazards of overexposure to radiation are no less justified
because the federal government has arrived at what it considers safe
standards" Radiation disease is relatively new to science, and there is
disagreement among experts as to what constitutes safe levels of released
radiation.9
The conflict developing in Minnesota may be a prototype of federal-state controversies to come in the area of environmental control.
Faced with overlapping state and federal powers to protect the public
health and welfare, courts may find a comprehensive scheme of federal
regulation to supersede state regulation of the same subject matter. 10
There is, however, support within the framework of concurrent powers
and the traditional doctrine of preemption for upholding conflicting
state regulation in such areas of potentially urgent need.
varying state regulations but only that- the doctrine of federal preemption should not bar
state action in such an area of immediate need when current federal safety standards
become subject to doubt.
8 A recent development has underscored the increasing necessity for state vigilance
in the area of radiation hazards. After a large fire in May 1969 a group of Colorado
scientists made an independent study of the amounts of radioactive plutonium released
over the years into the air, water, and soil by the Rocky Flats, Colorado, atomic bomb
manufacturing plant. They reported their findings to the AEC. The AEC did not dispute
the levels of plutonium found, but disagreed with the scientists in their assessment of the
public health hazards represented by such levels. The Colorado group had found a
"serious threat to the health and safety of the people of Denver," but the AEC
insisted that the levels discovered posed no public health hazard. Notwithstanding this
ominous difference of opinion, it is significant that until the Colorado group's study, the
AEC itself was unaware of the buildup of any released plutonium beyond the plant
boundaries. By its own admission, the Commission had failed to monitor adequately for
such released radioactive buildup. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
9 At the present time scientists within the AEC itself are beginning to question the
safety of AEC standards. Id., Jan. 18, 1970, at 26, col. 1.
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare has called for a reevaluation of
federal radiation controls. Id., March 16, 1970, at 47, col. 7 (city ed.).
The AEC is currently proposing changes in its regulations which would not reduce
the present maximum permissible limits of radiation emissions but which would require
new nudear power plants to strive to reduce emissions as far below these limits as
possible. In announcing this proposal, the AEC revealed that this, of course, has always
been the Commission's policy and the purpose now is to put it in writing. Id., March
28, 1970, at 23, col. I (city ed.).
10 There is no constitutional bar to state police power; the state has the power
to protect its citizens as does the federal government. The particular state action in exercise
of its police power may overlap with federal action on the same subject matter, in that
the federal government may reach the subject via its powers over such matters as the
general welfare, national defense, or interstate commerce. In these circumstances the
Constitution provides the basis, via the supremacy clause, for the displacement of the
state action. See text at notes 26-30 infra.
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I
COMPETING STArE AND FEDERAL PowERs

A.

Power to Protect the Public Health and Welfare

The ability of the state to act for the protection of the health,
safety, welfare, and morals of its citizens has been traditionally acknowledged as the state's police power.'" At one time the states had a monopoly on such police power objectives under the theory of "federal
equilibrium," which held that the national and state governments were
equal sovereigns, but possessed mutually exclusive powers. 12 Today, the
states have no such exclusive sphere of power; when the Supreme Court
finally upheld New Deal legislation in the late 1930's, the equilibrium
theory was laid to rest and with it the notion of police power exclusive
to the states.13
There currently exists, however, a healthy respect for the state's
police power, both in Congress and the Supreme Court. Congress indicated its desire not to displace state police power in enacting air
pollution control legislation; 14 in Supreme Court cases upholding allegedly preempted state action, an attitude of deference to the exercise
of state police power is apparent. 15
A federal power analogous to the police power is derived from
11

E.g., Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 58-62 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,

657-70 (1887). See LmPARY oF CONGRESS, THE CONsruTION OF THE UNrrED STATES OF

AslUcA, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1085, 1089 (Small ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as CONsTrrUTON ANNOTATm]. Other goals subsumed under the police power include
the protection of the public interest in the promotion of the economic interests of the
community and the promotion of the public convenience. Id. at 1089 and cases cited
therein.
12 Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1950). The
tenth amendment reserves to the states those "powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution." The states, as sovereigns equal to the federal government, could
claim exclusive power to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their
citizenry. Corwin, supra, at 15-17.
13 Corwin, supra note 12, at 17. Federal regulatory schemes of much lesser magnitude
than that of atomic energy have displaced state exercise of police power. For example, in
the area of interstate railroad rates and liability, most state regulation has been precluded.
Abraham & Loder, The Supreme Court and the Preemption Question, 53 Ky. L.J. 289,
319-21 (1965).
14 ["The Congress finds-] that the prevention and control of air pollution at its
source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments ......
Air Quality
Act of 1967, § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
15 Abraham & Loder, supra note 13, at 307. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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clause.' 6

the general welfare
This clause has been interpreted as a
substantive grant of legislative power to Congress. 17 Further support
for analogous federal power is provided by the broad construction of
the "necessary and proper" clause 8 which led to the doctrine of implied
powers. 19 The latter clause was held to justify all legislative means
appropriate to achieving legitimate ends of the Constitution, 20 thus
paving the way for Congress to expand the powers enumerated in the
Constitution by exercising them for ulterior police purposes. 21
Activities regulated by the state under its police power may also
come under federal control via the power of Congress over particular
subject matter, without regard to health and safety objectives. Thus
the federal commerce, proprietary, admiralty, defense, taxing, and
spending powers22 have been the basis of federal regulation of matters
such as radiation from atomic energy sources, 23 air pollution, 24 and

water pollution.

25

16 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, provides in part: "The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States...."
17 Corwin, supra note 12, at 5-6. The preamble to the Constitution lends support to
this, noting, among others, the constitutional objectives to "promote the general Welfare."
But see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-67 (1936) which construes "the general
Welfare" as the confines within which the power to "lay and collect Taxes" is conferred
by U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
The protection of public health and welfare can be a concomitant of the exercise of
the federal commerce power. See Edelman, FederalAir and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEo. WAsIr.

L. RFv. 1067, 1076-77 (1965).
18 US. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
19 The groundwork of the doctrine was laid in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED 93-95; Corwin, supra note 12, at 7.
20 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
21 See CONSrTtrrION ANNOTATED 357-62. In the Lottery Cases, 188 U.S. 321 (1903),
Congress began to expind its powers by exerting the commerce power for the ulterior

purpose of improving public morals. Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARv. L.

REv.

200, 217-20 (1927).
22 The federal power to tax and spend has long been held "limited only by the
requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United
States." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
23 The federal defense, proprietary, admiralty, and commerce powers have been
exercised in the area of peaceful atomic energy radiation control. Estep 9- Adelman,
supra note 4, at 44-54; Helman, supra note 3, at 56-57.
24 The federal commerce power has been exercised in the control of interstate air
pollution. In conjunction with the federal power over the navigable air space, the
commerce power has been exercised to regulate intrastate air pollution. Edelman, supra
note 17, at 1070-73, 1078-87; Note, The Expanding Scope of Air Pollution Abatement, 70
W. VA. L. Rv. 195, 200-01 (1968).
25 The federal commerce power and power over navigable waters, among others,
have been exercised to regulate water pollution. Edelman, supra note 17, at 1070-78.
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The ConstitutionalBasis of Federal Power to Preempt

Only a few relatively insignificant governmental powers are expressly delegated by the Constitution exclusively to the federal government. 26 The implication is that no others are, as a constitutional
matter,2 7 exclusively federal in nature.28 This conclusion opens all
major federal powers to concurrent state exercise, but it is qualified by
the doctrine of federal supremacy. Article 6, clause 229 of the Constitution renders the Constitution itself and "the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., the supreme Law of the
Land." The effect of this provision is to give Congress the power to
impede the state's exercise of concurrent power by means of legislation,
otherwise constitutional, that displaces state laws.30
26 U.S. CONsIr. art. I, § 10, ci. 1, provides in part: "No State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money;
emit Bills of Credit .... " Hence these few powers are expressly exclusive to the federal
government. Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power, 34 CoLUM. L. REv. 995,
997-1009 (1934).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 17 provides that "[the Congress shall have the power] to
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over [the District of Columbia], and
to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of
the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings." This does not mandate exclusive federal power in
the areas specified but leaves to Congress the decision to exercise such power exclusively.
Grant, supra, at 999 n.17.
27 A frequent and historical use of the term "exclusive power" applies it to those
powers the exercise of which by the states would be "incompatible" with a grant of the
same to the federal government. At one time such incompatibility was treated by the
Supreme Court as a constitutional matter, which it is not. Grant, supra note 26, at
998-99; see Bikl6, supra note 21, at 214-20. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299, 315-21 (1851).
28 Grant, supra note 26, at 997-1009. The major powers of the federal government
are set forth in U.S. CONsr. art I, § 8, which begins "The Congress shall have power..
but which makes mention of exclusivity only in clause 17. Note 26 supra.
29 This provision reads in full:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
3o See note 33 infra.
This rationale was tempered by the tenth amendment which declares that powers
not delegated to the federal government, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the
states or to the people. The Supreme Court gave the tenth amendment force as an
effective limitation on federal legislation for the duration of the period of dual federalism.
J. FLYNN, FEDERALIsM AND STArn ANTrrRUST REGULATION 113-14 (1964); Corwin, supra note
12, at 13-17. . However, the Court has returned to the construction, dating from
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819), that the tenth amendment
itself does not affect the quantum of federal power. If federal legislation is in the first
instance an exercise of delegated power, then it has passed the only relevant test. Nothing
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II
THE PREEMPTION QUESTION: ABILITY OF THE STATE TO EXERCISE
CONCURRENT POWERS

Distinguishable from the question of whether Congress may validly displace state regulation of an activity81 is the more complex issue
of whether it has precluded state action. The latter question devolves
upon the judiciary, 2 as does the former, but is not a constitutional issue
83
in itself.
is added to the test for constitutionality of a federal act by the statement that powers

not delegated are reserved. J.FLYNN, supra at 112-15 and cases cited therein; Estep &
Adelman, supra note 4, at 45. See Corwin, supra note 12, at 13-17. The ninth and tenth
amendments "have frequently been linked together and, particularly in recent years,
written off as redundancies .... " Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained by
the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787, 804 (1962).
Thus it is argued that there is no state power to be found in the tenth amendment.
However, it has been proposed that this amendment does limit both federal and state
power in favor of rights retained by the people. Redlich, supra at 802-12. Cf. Call,
Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DicK. L. Rlv. 121, 128-31 (1960). The ninth
amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." See also Kutner, The
Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained By the People, 51 MARQ. L.
REV. 121, 134-42 (1968).
A corollary of this argument would have a right of self-protection retained by the
people and enforceable by the state as guardian of the people's rights. See Comment,
Air Pollution, Pre-emption,Local Problems and the Constitution-Some Pigeonholes and
Hatracks, 10 Amuz. L. Rv. 97, 104-06 (1968). Cf. Call, supra; Kutner, supra. The state
would oppose any infringement including that of a preemptive federal scheme which
would potentially hamper the state's efforts. The net result is a limitation on federal
power to preempt state action, and this would be useful in support of state exercise of
police power to protect its citizens from imminent pollution dangers.
31 Its laws must be in "Pursuance" of the Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cI. 2.
32 The Supreme Court has been the final arbiter of the allocation of power in
the federal system since Marbury v. Madison, 5 US. (I Cranch) 368 (1803). See Corwin,
supra note 12, at 15-16.
33 The power of Congress to displace state laws derives from the supremacy clause
of the Constitution, hence the issue of whether or not Congress may displace state laws
turns on the constitutionality of the federal law itself. Whether the state law is displaced
turns on whether it is "to the Contrary" of federal laws "in Pursuance" of "This
Constitution." U.S. CONsr. art. VI, ci. 2. If the state law is unconstitutional in the first

instance, then no issue of federal preemption is properly reached, since it is "to the
Contrary" of "This Constitution" rather than the "Laws of the United States . . . in
Pursuance thereof"; the issue of the constitutionality of state laws is grounded in the
supremacy clause, as is the issue of preemption, but the former is an issue of contrariety with the Constitution itself:
The declaration of the supremacy clause gives superiority to valid federal

acts over conflicting state statutes but this superiority for present purposes involves
merely the construction of an act of Congress, not the constitutionality of the
state enactment.
Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 358-59 (1940). See Schwarzer, Enforcing Federal Suprem.
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Congress may expressly declare its intention to preclude state regulation of a subject matter. For example, the Air Quality Act of 1967
expressly prohibits state regulation of emissions from new automobiles.34
Should a state impose its own emission standards a court would have
no difficulty finding repugnance between the state and federal laws, 85
congresand consequently holding the state law inoperative; 86 specific
37
sional intent to exercise supreme legislative power is clear.
In most cases turning on the question of preemption the court is
faced with state regulation that has not been specifically anticipated
by Congress. 38 Hence no express statement by Congress on the subject
is available to implement the congressional ability to make laws "in
Pursuance" of the Constitution, such that "the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."3 9 In these cases it devolves upon
the court to detect the existence of such contrariety before proceeding
40
to the task of enforcing supreme federal law.
acy: Relief Against Federal-State Regulatory Conflicts, 43 CAQu. L. REv. 234, 245 & n.51
(1955). But see Note, Preemption as a PreferentialGround: A New Canon of Construction,
12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 209-10 & n.11 (1959).
34 Air Quality Act of 1967, § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
35 In such a case Congress will have dealt with the precise question faced by the
court and the latter need only reiterate and enforce what is, in effect, a congressional
declaration of contrariety.
30 This is a finding of preemptive contrariety, not constitutional contrariety. Note 33
supra. In practical terms the immediate effect of either kind of contrariety is identicalstate regulations are interdicted. The distinction has been obscured and with it the
distinction between contrariety of state law with federal laws "in. Pursuance" and
contrariety of state law with "This Constitution." A finding of the former is subject
to congressional overruling, in that Congress may subsequently enact legislation that
consents to state action. Grant, supra note 26, at 1008-09. A finding of constitutional
contrariety, however, is not subject to such legislative revision.
37 It has been proposed that Congress enact a requirement that no future act of
Congress be construed as indicating congressional intent to supersede state laws on the
same subject matter unless, inter alia, federal legislation contains an express provision to
that effect. See Wham & Merrill, FederalPre-Emption:How to Protect the States' Jurisdiction, 43 A.B.A.J. 131, 134 (1957). Cf. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148,
177-79 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
This "shotgun approach" has been introduced as legislation in many sessions of
Congress, but never passed. The objective of such bills is to remove from the judiciary
the power to decide the question of implied congressional supersedure. J. FLYNN, supra
note 30, at 124-25.
It has been suggested that even where federal legislation expressly supersedes state
regulation, as in the case of late model motor vehicle pollution control, there may be
sufficient jeopardy of state or individual constitutional rights that a balancing approach
may be preferable to invoking immediately the supremacy clause. Comment, supra note 30.
38 See J. FLYNN, supra note 30, at 126.
30 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
40 See notes 32-33 supra.
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A judicial finding of contrariety may stem from a provision in
federal law regulating the same activity that is the subject of state action.
Comparing and contrasting the provisions of the two sovereigns, the
court may find them fatally in conflict. 41 Conflict may take the form

of opposing provisions, as where the state nullifies federally granted
rights. 42 It may take the form of state provisions that "supplement"
the federal,43 or it may be found in provisions that are merely "coincidental" or "duplicative." 44 It is evident that such a finding of "conflict"
is dispositive of the issue. The finding is merely shorthand for the
court's determination that preemptive contrariety is present. If, on
consideration of all relevant factors, supersedure seems appropriate to
the court, the state regulation is in conflict with that of Congress. 4
The conclusory nature of "conflict" is even more apparent where
federal action comprises an elaborate and pervasive scheme of regulation. The court may shift to notions of "danger of conflict" 46 or "occuSee Abraham &cLoder, supra note 13, at 291-98, 307-08.
E.g., Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (state antitrust laws
prohibitive of collective bargaining agreements authorized by federal laws); Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 588 (1945) (state licensing requirements prohibitive of employee freedom
of choice of collective bargaining representative as authorized by federal laws). Preemptive opposition has also been found where state law authorizes that which federal law
forbids. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
When the state law opposes the federal law in express language or basic policy, the
issue apparently becomes a pure question of supremacy; the state law must fall as soon
as its nature is discerned by the court. However, the fact remains that the court must make
the inquiry into the nature of the two laws in order to pronounce their opposition.
Its action can be rationalzied as implementing the "implied intent" of Congress to
preclude directly opposing state laws. This kind of supersedure is distinct, then, in that
the court need not reach the point of balancing the competing interests of the federal
government and the states in the matter in hand. See note 56 and accompanying text infra.
43 E.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 858 U.S. 1 (1957) (state attempt to fill a
gap in the federal regulatory scheme in the field of labor relations).
The Court has found no conflict in other cases of supplemental state laws. E.g.,
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329 (1951)
(state law filling gap in federal regulation of natural gas).
44 Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915) (stateimposed liability of carrier duplicative of federal penalty). "When Congress has taken
the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a
state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has
seen fit to go." Id. at 604 (Holmes, J.).
Other coincidental state laws have been held to present no conflict. E.g., California
v. Zook, 836 U.S. 725 (1949) (state-imposed liability of carrier duplicative of federal
penalty). "[T]he fact of identity does not mean the automatic invalidity of state measures.
Coincidence is only one factor in a complicated pattern of facts guiding us to congressional
intent:' Id. at 730.
45 J. FLYNN, supra note 80, at 125-85. See AToMS AND THE LAw 1008-47; Abraham Sc
Loder, supra note 13, at 291-311.
46 See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 859 U.S. 236, 246 (1959)
41
42
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pation of the field" 47 in cases where state regulation concerns a specific
activity not itself regulated by a federal program but in a broader field
of federal control. From the degree of federal "occupancy" is drawn the
implication that no room remains for state action. 48
The original criteria for a judicial determination of federal preemption were announced in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.49 Here the
Supreme Court divided the federal power over interstate commerce
into subjects national in character and requiring a uniform rule of
regulation and subjects local in character permitting or necessitating
diversity of regulation. 50 The former were presumed to be exclusively
the subjects of federal commerce power,5 ' and that presumption was
tantamount to framing the preemption question as a constitutional
issue. 2 A judicial finding that the subject matter of regulation lends
itself to uniformity of control is nothing more than a balancing of national and local interests in the particular case.53 There does not appear
(state remedy for economic injuries resulting from peaceful picketing potentially
conflicting with the federal scheme of regulation which may protect or prohibit the same
activity, as the NLRB so determines).
47 See, e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 US. 605, 613 (1926).
48 See Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946: Ten
Years of Federalism, 60 HARv. L. REv. 262, 266-69 (1946).
It has been suggested that "occupancy of the field" is merely a rubric applied by the
Court when concerned with the completeness with which Congress has regulated the
particular subject matter rather than the presence of conflict, the issue being the
desirability of additional state regulation. Note, State Control of Subversion: A Problem
in Federalism,66 HARv. L. REv. 327, 329-50 (1952).
The Court has upheld state laws despite extensive federal action in the field.
Kennedy & Weekes, Control of Automobile Emissions-California Experience and the
FederalLegislation, 33 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 297, 313 n.66 (1968) and cases cited therein.
In areas where Congress had enacted no legislation covering the general subject
matter of state regulation, congressional silence was at one time interpreted as implying
congressional "intent" that no regulation is to be imposed. BikIW, supra note 21, at 214-20.
It has been suggested that the exclusion of state laws by congressional silence, a
phenomenon of the period of dual federalism, was actually a finding by the Court of the
unconstitutionality of the state enactment on other grounds although nominally a preemption issue. J. FLYNN, supra note 30, at 111-12; Note, supra note 33.
49 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). This test was later discarded. Note, "Occupation of
the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936.1946: Ten Years of Federalism, 60 HAv. L.
REv. 262, 267-68 (1946).
50 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319-20.
51 Bikl6, supra note 21, at 200-04.
52 If the commerce power over subjects of "national" concern were constitutionally
exclusive to the federal government, then a determination of the national character of the
subject of the case at hand would be sufficient to preclude state action as being
contrary to the Constitution. No contrariety to federal laws "in Pursuance thereof" would
need be shown. Note 33 supra. The Constitution, however, does not make such a division
of exclusive power. Notes 26-28 supra.
53 This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties
or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expres-
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to be any inherent quality of a "field" that earmarks it as peculiarly
adapted to federal uniformity.
Since Cooley, the Supreme Court has relied on many factors in
preemption cases which can be associated with the preemptionist or
non-preemptionist leanings of the individual justices of the Court. 4
sions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none
of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive
constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear
distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to determine whether, under
the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 812 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
The Supreme Court, however, reverted to such timeworn expressions of the test in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 US. 497, 502-05 (1956):
First, "[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it:' . . .
Second, the federal statutes "touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject."...
Third, enforcement of state sedition acts presents a serious danger of conflict
with the administration of the federal program.
54 The following guidelines have been identified by Abraham and Loder as used to
justify upholding congressional displacement of state power: congressional legislation in
a field immediately precludes state power in that field despite the delayed effectiveness
of the federal act; signs of congressional intent to preclude state action are revealed in
the wording and scope of federal acts, i.e., comprehensive terminology and/or elaborate,
pervasive federal scheme of regulation; partial entry of Congress into a defined field can
remove the states from that field totally; congressional intent to preempt is shown
when the statute spells out ways that federal agencies may cede jurisdiction to state
agencies; Congress has preempted a field when it makes no express provision for federalstate cooperation; in labor-management cases, the federal government displaces state
power over activities only arguably subject to § 7 and/or § 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act;
federal agencies must act to preempt the states from a field, or must merely act in the
field, or must merely have jurisdiction over the field; the federal government may
preempt fields traditionally occupied by the states as long as it is exercising delegated
power or taking necessary and proper means to exercise such power; once Congress
enters a field the states have no authorization to add to or supplement even the most
modest federal schemes; state laws which coincide with or duplicate federal statutes fall
whether there is a danger of conflict or not; danger of conflict between federal and state
governments supports preemption; state exercise of traditional police power may be
precluded by congressional entry into a field.
Other guidelines have supported the Court's upholding state power: the Court
should not usurp the ability of Congress to specify its intentions concerning preemption;
Congress in legislating not only spells out what it will cover but circumscribes its
coverage; the absence of uniform national rules in a field implies the need for state
action; there are signs in federal acts that state action is not only tolerated but greatly
needed; no signs of congressional intent to preclude state action are revealed in the
comprehensive terminology and/or elaborate, pervasive scheme of regulation in federal
acts; neither federal administrative action nor inaction in themselves imply congressional
intent to preempt; the Court may respect federal agency decisions to promote or at
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For one justice the pervasiveness of the federal scheme is a sign of
congressional intent to preclude state action while for another it is not.
Contrary conclusions on preemption are also reached from such considerations as the existence of federal administrative jurisdiction or
action in the field, and even the exercise of traditional state police
power in the field entered by Congress. 5
It is evident that a determination of implied supersedure of state
action amounts to a judicial balancing of competing federal and state
interests rather than a finding of preemption by a Congress that has
actually entertained the question of competing state laws.58
least acquiesce in state action; state legislation may coincide with or supplement federal
statutes; coincidence and duplication of state and federal legislation does not per se
displace state legislation; mere showing of a danger of conflict is not enough to support
preemption; the historic exercise of state police and tax powers may support upholding
state action.
Guidelines used in conjunction with those above, and going both ways on the
preemption question, include: the question of dominant federal interest; the question
of whether or not there is a conflict; concern for possible burdens on interstate commerce;
whether Congress wants preemptible uniformity; the bearing of the legislative history
of the federal enactment on the preemption question. Abraham & Loder, supra note 13,
at 291-311. See Hunt, Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 53
MicH. L. Rv. 407, 417-25 (1955).
55 Abraham 8- Loder, supra note 13, at 291-311.
56 In the words of the Supreme Court:
The comprehensive regulation of industrial relations by Congress, novel federal
legislation twenty-five years ago but now an integral part of our economic life,
inevitably gave rise to difficult problems of federal-state relations. To be sure,
in the abstract these problems came to us as ordinary questions of statutory
construction. But they involved a more complicated and perceptive process than
is conveyed by the delusive phrase, "ascertaining the intent of the legislature."
Many of these problems probably could not have been, at all events were not,
foreseen by the Congress. Others were only dimly perceived and their precise
scope only vaguely defined. This Court was called upon to apply a new and
complicated legislative scheme, the aims and social policy of which were drawn
with broad strokes while the details had to be filled in, to no small extent, by the
judicial process. Recently we indicated the task that was thus cast upon this Court
in carrying out with fidelity the purposes of Congress, but doing so by giving
application to congressional incompletion.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239-40 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.).
The Court must interpret both the state and federal legislation involved. To assist
the determination of congressional intent on the matter of conflicting state laws, it has
been proposed to require the inclusion in congressional committee reports of statements
of the existing state laws in the area of each bill, the intended effect of the bill on
them, and the intended preclusion of future state regulation. Wham & Merrill, supra
note 37, at 190. This is far from a panacea for the preemption question. The kinds of
overlap of federal and state laws are often not readily foreseeable as, for example, a state
regulation of the smoke emission in port of a vessel otherwise regulated under the
federal commerce power. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
Supersedure as a matter of judicial interpretation may, of course, be expressly overruled
by Congress at any time.
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III
UPHOLDING HIGHER STATE STANDARDS

A. A Presumption in Favor of Concurrent State Power
When a state acts to protect the health and safety of its citizens by
imposing more stringent controls on hazardous activities than are provided by the federal government, it acts, in the first instance, within its
primary power under the federal system. 57 Faced with the question of
federal preemption in a case of such state action, the court must decide
whether, on balance, federal regulation stands as a bar to the state-is
the federal interest paramount to the state's pursuit of the health and
safety of its citizens? If the former reduces merely to a need for "uniformity" of regulation, then the state interest must prevail. 8 A judicial
determination of an implied congressional intent to preempt should at
least require a finding of overriding federal concern for the health and
safety of the nation's citizenry; otherwise such a determination should
not stand in the way of local exercise of the police power.
In the case of radiation hazards of an atomic bomb plant, 9 it is
conceivable that federal interest in defense of the nation as a whole
may outweigh local interest in an environment safe to live in. But in
the case of hazards posed by atomic power plants, no such national de60
fense rationale exists to override local health and safety interests.
Where Congress has failed to expressly articulate an interest in exclusive federal environment control, the courts should indulge a presumption in favor of concurrent state action. When a state exercises its police
power to regulate more strictly in response to reasonable apprehension
over federal standards, 61 the burden of proof on the issue of the federal
interest should fall on the party asserting preemption. The supremacy
doctrine should not be permitted to obscure the policy of protecting
human health, safety, and welfare which is amply supported by the
62
Constitution.
This reasoning and presumption should apply to any state efforts
to impose stricter standards of pollution control in areas that are open
57 See text at notes 11-15 supra.
58 See text at notes 49-56 supra.
59 Note 8 supra.
60 "Mhe national interest in health and safety of the public could hardly be
jeopardized by state regulations which place stricter limits than the federal regulations
impose on the permissible amount of radiation exposure." Estep & Adelman, supra note 4,
at 44.
61 Notes 8-9 supra.
62 See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
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to continuing question as the health effects of pollutants begin to
63
materialize.
The Precedent of Violent Picketing: State Action Upheld
The Supreme Court has previously indicated its willingness to uphold limited, concurrent state exercise of police power in a "federal
field"; confronted with impending emergency, the state, as guardian of
public health and safety, can act, notwithstanding the doctrine of preemption. In the field of labor-management relations, in order to promote the "national labor policy," the Court has articulated a general
rule that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction of activities arguably
subject to sections 7 and 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 64 State power is
displaced with regard to issues of arguably protected concerted activities and arguably prohibited unfair labor practices.6 5 However, state
regulation of violent or potentially violent picketing has been upheld. 6
Thus in an area of urgent state concern the Court has deferred to state
police power despite the existence of an elaborate and pervasive scheme
of federal regulation of the field of labor-management relations and the
specific activity of picketing.6 7 In the words of the Court:
B.

63 We are in the infancy of understanding the full health impact of, for example,
specific air pollutants and air pollution in general. Cassell, The Health Effects of Air
Pollution and Their Implications for Control, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1968).
64 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
65 Id. at 244-46.
66 UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
67 One analysis of the preemption issue in the field of labor relations noted that
[e]ven where the federal act is broad and inclusive and delegates quasi-judicial
power over matters which affect public health and safety to the federal agency,
the Supreme Court is reluctant to declare the state powerless to avert a local,
immediate, and substantial hazard to persons and property in the area.
ATOMS AND THE tmW 1028.
The writers, however, found the UAW case of limited significance for the atomic
energy field because (1) the danger in the latter field would not be analogous to the
immediate and violent threat of damage to person and property caused by the mass and
violent picketing situation, and (2) the Atomic Energy Act is centrally concerned with
the public health and safety whereas the federal labor laws reflect a primary interest in
economic, political, and social considerations and hence less of an intent to preempt.
Id. at 1019-20.
The first point is not persuasive if the federal radiation standards are in fact dangerously low, permitting an overdose of radiation emissions to reach the populace. See
notes 8-9 supra. In that case the threat may be even more immediate because the "cumulative effect" and "genetic impact" of repeated radiation doses delay the appearance of the
full health consequences. The degree of potential harm may well be analogous to that
of potentially violent picketing activities. See Estep & Adelman, supra note 4, at 44.
The second point begs the question by raising the issue of congressional intent in
terms of the purpose of the federal scheme. The issue should be whether the interest
of the federal government outweighs that of the state, not whether it is also a health
interest. See text at notes 57-62 supra.
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The dominant interest of the State in preventing violence and
property damage cannot be questioned. It is a matter of genuine
local concern. Nor should the fact that a union commits a federal
unfair labor practice while engaging in violent conduct prevent
States from taking steps to stop the violence....
The States are the natural guardians of the public against
violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the fear
and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction. We would not interpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless to avert such
68
emergencies without compelling directions to that effect.
CONCLUSION

The action taken by Minnesota in regulating the escape of harmful
radiation can be compared to state action to enjoin violent or potentially
violent picketing. Faced with the threat of adverse effects on public
health and safety, the state must act to regulate offending activity before
harm is realized. The nature of problems of environment protection
causes them to be national in scope; pollution recognizes no state
boundaries. 69 Effective environmental control may require effective
federal regulation. Nevertheless, the interest of the state in protecting
its citizens from fouling of the environment that has not been properly
evaluated by federal regulatory programs outweighs the overall need
for national uniformity in the field. State standards in excess of those
imposed by the federal government should be upheld by courts in the
0
face of evidence that the latter are inadequate3 Conceivably such state
action may stimulate the federal government to pursue more effective
standards of control, ultimately in the spirit of cooperative federalism.
Samuel C.V.D. Kilbourn
68 UAW. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1956).

69 See, e.g., Zimmerman, PoliticalBoundaries and Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URBAN
L. 173 (1969).
70 That current federal programs are inadequate, see, for example, O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAw & CONTEmnP. PROB. 275 (1968) and Reitze,
supra note 1. Cf. Cassell, supra note 65.

